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In this paper I wish to consider the possibility that at least one version of the extended mind argument fails to provide good reasons for considering memory as extended. The argument in question is that presented in Clark and Chalmers’ original paper (1998a,
1998b; reprinted in Clark 2008), and in particular in the elaboration of the Otto and Inga thought experiment. However some time will also be spent looking at supplementary arguments presented in later work (particularly Clark 2008, 2010).












of memory. Such a view would focus not on access to the contents of a store but on remembering as a type of action. In section 5 we then consider the possibility that although remembering may not consist in access to a store, it is nevertheless common- place that we come to regard it as such. This state of affairs, it is suggested, might itself have something to do with our use of external resources for information retrieval. In section 6 we turn to Vygotsky. His account is relevant both because his description of the
‘internalization’ of psychological processes such as memory shares some common
ground with this hypothesis, and because Clark (along with other EM commentators) takes his own account to be to some degree influenced by Vygotsky. Section 7 draws some of these threads together. Vygotskyan considerations do not offer support for the objectified elements of Clark and Chalmer’s account of extended memory, but only for a





2 Otto and Inga

Even those with very poor memories can probably recall the details of the Otto and Inga story: Otto has Alzheimer’s disease, thus impairing his memory. In order to help him remember things he writes down any new information he ‘learns’ in a notebook which he carries with him. Included amongst his notes are addresses of buildings. Unlike Otto, Inga has normal memory function. She and Otto hear separately of an exhibition at the museum and both decide to go. Inga pauses to recall where the museum is located (53rd Street) before walking there. Otto looks up the address in his notebook before walking there.
In both cases we can say, according to C&C, that the individual concerned wanted to go to the museum and believed that the museum was on 53rd   Street. We can say this because “the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga” (Clark and Chalmers 1998a, p.13). Moreover, in both cases it is legitimate to characterize the individuals concerned as having had their beliefs before they consulted their respective information sources; we can say of Inga that “the belief was sitting somewhere in memory waiting to be accessed” (Clark and Chalmers
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One thing that perhaps strikes us about this account is the rather objectified conception of biological memory which seems to underpin it. Memory is conceived in store-like fashion as a physical location wherein are deposited a certain, presumably quantifiable, number of beliefs to which one has “access” (ibid. p.15) just as one has access to the contents of a drawer (or a notebook).
The extent of this objectification becomes apparent from Clark’s remarks elsewhere. In (Clark 2008), for example, Clark replies to an argument, attributed to Martin Davies, that the access which Otto has to his notebook, because perceptual, is directed at an object in the public domain, whereas my beliefs and memories are something to which I have a “special kind of access” (2008, p.100). Clark’s response (omitting some complicating references to ‘multiple personality disorder’) is as follows:

..Why then suppose that uniqueness of access is anything more than a contin- gent fact about standard biological recall? If in the future science devised a way for you to occasionally tap into my stored memories, would that make them any
less  mine  or  part  of  my  cognitive  apparatus?…it  seems  to  be  at  most a  
contingent fact that I and I alone have a certain kind of access to my own biologically stored memories and beliefs. (Clark 2008, pp.100–101, author’s emphasis)


Here, then, on being presented with a traditional ‘privileged access’ account–accord- ing to which I have ‘access’ to my own memories (and beliefs) in a way that others don’t–Clark perhaps rightly decides that such a picture needs reforming. However, instead of arguing that the activity of remembering might not best be described in terms of objects to which one has ‘access’ in the first place, he takes the unusual route of leaving this element of the traditional picture untouched and instead waives the
‘privileged’ part, so that anyone might have the same ‘access’ to my own internal ‘store’ that I have. This would seem to have the unusual repercussion that my memories are only mine by virtue of their (literally conceived) spatial location, for in all other respects other people seem to be able to stand in the same relation to my memories as I do. I have my memories (and beliefs), we might say, in the same sense that I have a wristwatch. Indeed, if we marry this conception with Clark’s conjectures elsewhere concerning the plugging in of neural implants to perform mental functions (e.g. Clark and Chalmers
1998a; Clark 2003), it seems that others might be able to steal my memories just as they
might steal my wristwatch–or any other piece of my property–by getting hold of my neural implants and plugging them into their own brains.






life of the user, that the information it provides is directly available without difficulty and that it is automatically endorsable, having been consciously endorsed previously (Clark and Chalmers 1998a; Clark 2008, 2010). It is not clear, however, that these conditions do anything to undermine our case. In fact in their very detail they seem merely to reinforce the fundamental notion that memory–whether internal or external–is a particular type of resource that one carries about one’s person. Moreover, as we have said, it is precisely Clark’s point that these ‘trust and glue’ conditions (Adams and Aizawa 2008, p.121) do not establish the necessary peculiarity of my relationship to my own memories, for it seems conceivable, on Clark’s account, that the glue could come unstuck, allowing others access to my memories. To this reader, at least, such a conception would seem to violate the fundamental principle (explored e.g. by Wittgenstein 1953) that another cannot stand to my memories (or beliefs, or pains etc.) as I do. This is not so much because I have a
‘privileged access’ to my own memories, or because they are attached to me by a very strong glue, but because remembering is not best thought of as access to private–or in the case of C&C’s externalism, public–objects at all. We will return to this point shortly.
We might also notice a slight variant on this objectified approach to memory in a separate passage of the 1998 paper. As a rebuff to the anticipated objection that Otto’s interactions with the information in his notebook have a perceptual phenomenology, unlike Inga’s interactions with the contents of her memory, C&C ask us to consider the case of the ‘Terminator’ (in the Arnold Shwarzenegger movie):

When he recalls some information from memory, it is “displayed” before him in his visual field (presumably he is conscious of it, as there are frequent shots depicting his point of view.) The fact that standing memories are recalled in this unusual way surely makes little difference to their status as standing beliefs. (Clark and Chalmers 1998b, p.6)

The Terminator scenario perhaps raises interesting issues about memory. One partic- ular objection here, however, would seem to be that even if memory were unfailingly eidetic in nature, there would still be more to it than mere apprehension of a visual image or sequence of visual images. The character in the Terminator scenario is precisely not remembering merely by viewing a series of images–although those images might serve as a prompt to actual acts of remembering. As Shanon (1998) has argued, “there is nothing in the represented image itself (or in any mental representation) that distin- guishes it as a memory of the past” (p.165). That C&C should think otherwise, that they should think that images could be constituted as memories simply by virtue of their spatial presence, again speaks of a rather reified conception of memory.
We have said then that C&C conceive of biological memory in a somewhat objectified fashion. We might perhaps summarise the major constituents of this outlook as follows 1) Memory is a portable store that I carry about my person. 2) The contents of that store have an independent existence in and of themselves which is distinct from my acts of remembering them 3) In my acts of remembering I access these contents 4) Bearing in mind 1 & 2, it is entirely conceivable that others might access the self-same memory objects that I access.
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To an extent criticisms of at least some elements of this conception of memory are well known, for, we might say, what C&C have presented us with is a variant of a ‘storehouse’ approach to memory–albeit taken to its logical, and detachable extremes–an approach which has historically been challenged by philosophers and psychologists on a number of different grounds (Malcolm 1977; Ben-Ze’ev 1986, 1996; Koriat and Goldsmith 1996,
1998; Shanon 1998; Toth and Hunt 1999). This fact has not gone unnoticed by partic- ipants in the extended mind debate. For some commentators, the notions both that biological memory is storage and that external resources replicate this in a straightforward way, has seemed unproblematic. Thus Rowlands (1999) suggests that “external repre- sentational systems can be regarded as the exact external analogue of internal memory, namely a storage and retrieval system…” (p.142) On this view there is a simple equivalence between internal and external storage–“the external information-bearing structure stands in for the internal information bearing structure” (p.122)–and so a ‘parity’ argument (Clark and Chalmers 1998a; Clark 2010) is sufficient to establish the truth of C&C’s hypothesis.
For others, however, the purported similarities between internal memory and external storage, implied by C&C’s argument, present problems. Thus Sutton (2010), drawing on Donald’s (1991) work argues that in most instances a parity argument for extended memory is unconvincing because of the many differences between biological memory and the type of storage typically offered by external resources (‘exograms’). Whereas the latter can be, amongst other things, “passive, stable, medium and context indepen- dent” (p.206), biological memory is “active, reconstructive, and context dependent” (ibid, see also Sutton, 1998b). Nevertheless Sutton does not think the lack of equiva- lence between internal and external ‘storage’ implies the redundancy of an extended memory approach. Artifacts such as Otto’s notebook could still count as instances of extended memory, but on grounds of complementarity rather than functional equiva- lence (Sutton 2010, p.205).






Clark is aware of at least some of these objections. In (2008), for example, he alludes to a personal communication from Terry Dartnall according to which “the Otto scenario depends on an outmoded image of biological memory as a kind of static store of information awaiting retrieval and use” (p.97). Dartnall apparently stresses the “active nature of real memory” (ibid) and thus that the having of mere “sterile text” (ibid), as in the case of Otto’s notebook–or equivalently the embedding of an information-bearing chip in the brain–would not be sufficiently like  biological memory to count as a contender. As with Sutton and Michaelian’s accounts a key claim here is that (episodic) memory is “to a large extent reconstructive rather than literal” (ibid), a view which, as Hassabis and Maguire  (2009) point out, is widely accepted in contemporary psychology. This view  perhaps undermines to a limited extent what we have described as the second  constituent of Clark’s objectified outlook–that the contents of a memory store have an independent existence in and of themselves which is distinct from my acts of remembering them.
In response Clark acknowledges that there is indeed some dis-analogy between the
contents of the notebook and the contents of biological memory insofar as “that which is stored in Otto’s notebook won’t shift and alter while stored away” (Clark
2008, p.98). But, quite justifiably given his overall perspective, for Clark this is a difference that makes no difference. Odd things might happen to information which is stored in biological memory but this doesn’t change the fact that information is stored in biological memory, and is subsequently retrieved for the purpose of guiding reasoning and behaviour. Hence there is “sufficient functional similarity” (ibid) between the Otto and Inga cases to make the fine details of storage irrelevant.
We might say, then, that Clark makes efforts to accommodate at least one version of an ‘active’ critique of a storage conception of memory, but the result is only a reformed version of the latter. Instead of ‘static storage’ we have ‘active storage’. We might suggest too that what both Clark and his critics steer clear of is the idea that memory might not be a store at all, even if the properties of memory systems outlined by C&C’s critics depart radically from that suggested by the Otto story.
Before pursuing this point, however, we should add a proviso, for when reconstruc- tivist accounts are pushed to their limits, and supplemented with other insights, the notion of ‘storage’ itself seems to become quite precarious. Moreover, this point seems to have been accepted by Clark himself in an early exchange with Sutton (Sutton 1998b) on the topic of Clark’s (1997; see also Clark and Grush 1999) ‘minimal representation- alism’. On the latter view remembering or imagining absent or non-existent states of affairs is held to require ‘inner surrogates’ for that which is not present. Sutton objects that, in the case of autobiographical memory, whilst “some memories of the personal past may be stored fully formed” this need not be so in all cases:

Why should we expect all the psychological work of editing and condensing to have been done already, before the episode of remembering and neatly pack- aged in a single prior item, rather than occurring in the present in a causal conspiracy between different distributed traces and context-specific cues in current input? (Sutton 1998b p.93)
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the environment, might allow that nothing need be stored between an event and its remembering which counts in any strong sense as an ‘inner surrogate’ of a particular memory. Perhaps surprisingly, Clark agrees with this. He is fine with the idea that fully formed memories may not be stored as ‘persisting inner surrogates’ but rather might come into being ‘on the spot’ during acts of recall. All that matters for him is that:

…ongoing behaviour in such cases is explained by appeal to identifiable inner content bearers. The stability and long term persistence of such items is not an issue on which I have to take a stand. (Clark 1998, p.100)

On the issue of representationalism this response is perhaps something of a logical half-way house. Just as Clark had no objection to active storage so here he suggests that storage does not have to be ‘long term’. One might perhaps retort that if ‘identifiable content bearers’ are a possibility and a necessity for any measurable length of time then it might as well be for the relevant length of time e.g. from an event to its recollection.
Nevertheless Clark’s take on storage here does seem to be significantly different to




We have said, with one proviso, that neither Clark nor his critics seriously consider doing away with memory storage, and have implied thereby the possibility of a view which is more radical in this respect. The view in question is that which asserts both that memory might not be a store at all, and that remembering might be active in a stronger sense than a reconstructive account of memory by itself allows–i.e. that it might be fruitfully understood as a type of action. Taken together, we might note, these two possibilities suggest a perspective which not only runs counter in a more thoroughgoing way than Sutton, Michaelian and Dartnall’s accounts, to the first three propositions outlined above as assumptions of C&C’s objectified outlook (end of section 3), but also makes assumption 4 untenable. If remembering is not conceived of in terms of access to stored memory objects, but is rather a type of action, then there is no sense in imagining that others could have access to my memory objects.
We might perhaps call such a conception of memory an ‘enactive’ account of memory–remembering conceived of as a type of action or activity rather than as the retrieval of memory objects. It is not the aim of this paper to explore such a perspective in detail–or to argue that it constitutes the correct and only possible account of memory. For one thing an elaboration of this account would need to get clearer about the species of memory we were talking about. As various commentators, for differing reasons (e.g. Malcolm 1977; Michaelian 2011) have pointed out it seems unlikely that the term






across the board to all cases in which the terms ‘memory’ or ‘remember’ are used. At the same time, if the notion were to have any teeth, we would mean it to apply it across the declarative/procedural divide, for there would perhaps be nothing particularly surprising or useful in baptising procedural memory only as ‘enactive’.
For the purposes of this paper our aim is merely to suggest that such an outlook seems to be possible. Elements of such a view can be found in accounts of memory which reject representationalism (e.g. Ryle 1949; Malcolm 1977; Wittgenstein 1967; Stern 1991; Neisser 1996; Shanon 1998) and those which emphasize the active nature of memory in ways which go beyond mere reconstructivism (Stern 1991; Neisser
1996; Toth and Hunt 1999). As regards the former, grounds for rejecting represen- tationalism are many and varied (see Sutton 1998a, chap. 16 for a useful summary). Here we will merely briefly draw attention to two views in this tradition. Thus, for Shanon (1998), representations are rejected on Wittgensteinian grounds that they lead to an infinite regress. Recognition, for example, involves comparing a presently perceived image with one retrieved from the agent’s internal store. But, says Shanon, this comparison must itself involve some reference to a ‘standard’ by means of which the comparison is to be made and so thereby requires postulation of “representations of a second order” (p.165). Use of these representations will then in turn require a standard, and so on ad infinitum. A similar problem bedevils retrieval itself which requires that “I already have to know there is in my representational store a memory pertaining to the stimulus at hand” (ibid). Shanon therefore argues against the view which generates these problems–the representational view which character- izes memory “in terms of some underlying mental trace” (ibid).
Stern is likewise motivated by Wittgensteinian considerations, citing with approval the remark that:

Nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or nervous system which corresponds to a particular thought or a particular idea or memory. (Wittgenstein 1980, p.508)

He sees in such statements a justified critique of the common assumption that
‘memory must be a matter of storing something’ (Stern 1991, p.204), and, as with Shanon, has no time for the purported unit of storage, the ‘memory trace’. However, not unusually, he also thinks strong anti-representationalism compatible with con- nectionism, provided that the states of the relevant connectionist networks are not taken as constituting ‘distributed representations’ (p.208). We might note that it therefore becomes a matter of some complexity drawing a distinction between avowedly anti-storage, anti-trace but pro connectionist accounts such as Stern’s, and accounts such as Sutton’s (Sutton 1998b, 2010) which do not present themselves as anti-trace or anti-storage (per se) but nevertheless outline several respects in which memory is unlike storage, and see memory as contingent upon (amongst other things) distributed traces.
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interesting, however, is Toth and Hunt’s (1999) ‘neo-functionalist’ (p.256) approach to memory. Their starting point is a critique of ‘multiple systems’ accounts which they regard as attempting to explain memory in terms of its underlying structure(s). Such a project is flawed, they suggest, because memory systems are hypothetical, unobservable entities (p.247) which, being inferred from task performance, are ultimately incapable of independently explaining task performance without ‘funda- mental circularity’ (p.248). In place of this deference to unobservable structures–and based also on a general antipathy to representations and a scepticism about the existence of non-occurent memories–T&H suggest, like Neisser, that it is more useful to view ‘memory as doing’ (p.255):

Memory is not something stored ‘in’ the person or even ‘in’ the brain, any more than music is stored in the radio, or walking stored in the legs. In each case (memory, music, and locomotion), the system under investigation has the potential to achieve certain states, or exhibit particular actions, when relevant conditions are met, but these states or actions do not reside in the system. Like walking, memory is a dynamic event that exists only in its operation. (p.257, my italics)

It is significant that T&H’s account sounds, in certain places, like a hybrid extended memory account (e.g. Rowlands 1999; Menary 2007)–for the ‘memory as doing’ invoked also involves a shift outward from brain to world, and to a dynamic interaction with that world, which nevertheless acknowledges that the brain has a role to play:

[We propose] the relocation of memory from something that exists ‘in’ the person or brain to something that obtains in the interaction between the person (and their brain) and the environment in which acts of memory occur. (Toth and Hunt 1999, p.257)

However this view differs at least from C&C’s version of extended memory in its lack of objectification. On T&H’s account memory would not be found in Inga’s internal store (which has now been dispensed with) nor in Otto’s external store, but would rather be a feature of their activity. (We should perhaps note that there is more to T&H’s functionalism than an emphasis on activity, but other elements of their account are less relevant to our interests here).






memory could perhaps be placed in relation to a traditional internalist view and
C&C’s extended view as follows:


Internalist view	Extended view	Enactive view




There is an internal memory store
(at least very loosely speaking)








External resources are part of memory	No	Yes	No


This table is somewhat crude and it may be that there are few theorists who would identify completely with any of the views expressed by individual columns. Moreover each of the descriptors is vague and would probably benefit, at the expense of simplicity, from being broken down into further sub-statements. There are, for example, different senses in which memory might be thought to be ‘internal’ (row 1) and varying degrees and senses in which memories might be thought to be stored (row 2). Likewise–interpreted in a certain way everyone would agree that ‘remem- bering is an action’ (row 3) just as, taken in a certain way, everyone would agree with Noë that ‘perceiving is a way of acting’. Finally (row 4)–there are degrees to which different EM theorists might assent to the statement that external resources are part of memory.
Nevertheless it is hoped that the table succeeds in laying out at least the basic components of some possible positions and how they overlap or diverge at different points. We note, for example, that rows 1 & 4 shows the enactive view in agreement with C&C on the non-exclusively-internal nature of memory, but in agreement with the internalist view that external artifacts are not extended memory–thereby demon- strating that the only choices available are not those between internalism or extended memory.








We have said so far, then, that C&C have, in part, an ‘objectified’, conception of biological memory and it is this which makes the transposition of memory to external artifacts an easy move for them. We have also speculated that insofar as this objectification of memory can be identified with a ‘storage’ approach memory, there may be a possible ‘enactive’ alternative to such a conception.
These brief observations, however, do not constitute our main critique of C&C’s account of memory, although they are of great relevance to it. Rather we wish to put forward a further consideration which perhaps provides additional grounds for ques- tioning the idea that memory aids such as Otto’s notebook are best thought of as instances of extended memory.
In (2008) Clark outlines a further criticism of his position, this time put forward by Ron Chrisley (again in a personal communication). Chrisley apparently argues for a disanalogy between biological memory and Otto’s ‘note-book memory’ on develop- mental grounds:

…As children we do not begin by experiencing our biological memory as any kind of object or resource…because we do not encounter our own memory perceptually. Instead it is just part of the apparatus through which we relate to and experience the world. Might it be this special developmental role that decides what is to count as part of the agent and what is to count as part of the world? (Clark 2008, p.101)

Clark is not impressed by this as a line of attack. He suggests that it is possible that a child might begin by viewing her own bodily parts as objects, or conversely that nonbiological cognitive resources might be incorporated into her system at a young age such that they aren’t experienced by her as objects; or even that a child might be taught to view her own cognitive faculties in objectified fashion by being “plugged into biofeedback controllers” (ibid). Such developmental possibilities, says Clark, although interesting, are irrelevant to the notebook argument, for “what counts in the end is the resource’s current role in guiding reasoning and behaviour, not its historical positioning in a developmental nexus” (ibid. p.102).
It seems possible however that Clark has not dealt with ‘the developmental issue’ sufficiently here, for–expanding on Chrisley’s point–we might say that it is not just that as children we don’t experience our memory as an object or resource, but that if we do view or experience it as such later on, this might well be the result of interaction with external resources.






provisionally, remain agnostic about the extent to which this view of things is justified. It may be that we come to view ourselves as having a notebook-like memory even though our acts of remembering have little in common with looking something up in a notebook. Or it may be that there is a stronger sense in which our acts of remembering come to include operations somewhat analogous to retrieval of infor- mation from a store, even though the latter is not to be taken as implying the existence of a literally conceived internal store. In reality these two possibilities are perhaps not so distinct, for our conception of how we remember might have some influence on our practices of remembering. Let us, then, accept this premise also.





This is not an entirely novel idea, for we find arguments at least congenial to this standpoint in the work of Vygotsky (Vygotsky 1930, 1934, 1978; Vygotsky and Luria
1993). It is worth giving a brief summary of relevant elements of a Vygtoskyan approach here, not because we hold Vygotsky up as a timeless authority on all matters psychological but because his account bears some relation to our own and because Clark’s own position, as well as that of several subsequent commentators on the extended mind (e.g. Rowlands 1999; Menary 2007; Sutton 2009), are all to some degree influenced by Vygotskyan considerations.
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metamorphoses into “inner, soundless speech” (ibid. p.87) The internalization of an external medium (speech) has in this way “become the basis of a new and superior form of activity” (1978, p.28).
A similar story can be told with certain aspects of memory. In (1993) Vygotsky and Luria examine the development of memory in ‘primitive man’ and children. In the former case they outline research detailing the primitive use of “conventional auxiliary memory aids” (p. 102) such as modified feathers, knotted cords (‘quipu’) and other
‘mnemotechnical’ systems–culminating ultimately in writing–to achieve “dominance over memory” (p. 107). The adoption of these mediated strategies has concomitant effects on the development of memory itself, such that the latter is “no longer an independent process” but is “dependent on, subordinated to, and defined in the course of …changes originating from outside, from man’s social environment” (p.105).
In the case of children, here too mediated means are used to improve memory performance, but unlike primitive man, children do not typically have to devise such systems from scratch. Rather they acquire “ready-made systems” (p.177) to help them remember. Again, the deployment of these devices will have concomitant effects on the development of biological memory. Once the child has acquired the relevant systems “he transforms his natural processes by using them” (ibid.). Bakhurst (2007) describes one such scenario succinctly:

…the child first grasps external mediational means–for example, the practice of tying a knot in a handkerchief–and then she “internalizes” such techniques, coming to deploy mnemonic devices in thought. (p.54)

What such accounts give us then, at least in part, is a description of the effects of external artifact manipulation on memory.
At this point it should be noted that Vygotsky (and Luria) do also use phrases and expressions which, if considered in isolation, might seem amenable to a ‘spatially extended memory’ interpretation. Thus for example they state that: “all that enculturated mankind remembers and knows how…is indebted to external memory based on signs.” (Vygotsky and Luria 1993, p.108, my italics); and they say of a child who develops a notation system utilizing small pieces of paper that “his natural memory is replaced by the new artificial methods that he invented” (ibid. p.179). But it would be misleading to interpret these descriptions too literally. “External memory” and the ‘replacement’ of natural memory by ‘artificial methods’ are not intended to denote a spatially conceived extension or transposition of memory, but rather describe artifactual aids to memory. This is clear from the many passages where the talk is in terms of “memory aids” (ibid. p.102) “tools of memory” (p.107) and an “organized system of external signs that assist memory” (p.186, my emphasis). It is true that these are very powerful devices which change the way we use our memory, but this very fact just reinforces the notion that their significance lies in the impact they have on ‘memory itself’–“the child manipulates the external objects to gain control of the internal memory process” (p.179).






…enjoy[s] in the shape of things only an external realization of himself” (Hegel 1835, p.31)–but again this has little to do with the spatial augmentation of mental contents or their literal transference to external artefacts. Moreover, and significantly, it is a ‘dialec- tical’ process which is ongoing, and bi-directional rather than uni-directional in nature. The agent brings about changes in the external world and is in turn affected by these changes, which in turn affects the agent’s subsequent actions and so on. It is in this respect that Vygotsky remarks of child development that it is “a complex dialectical process characterized by…..intertwining of external and internal factors” (Vygotsky 1978, p.73).


7 Extended  Notebooks

How then do these Vygotskyan considerations relate to C&C’s version of extended memory and our critique of it? As we have said, Clark’s outlook is to some degree explicitly informed by a Vygotskyan approach. In (Clark 1997), for example, Vygotsky’s work forms the backdrop for his own reworking of the concept of ‘scaffold- ing’ (pp.45–47). Although neither Vygotsky nor Luria used the term ‘scaffolding’ the term has been linked with Vygotskyan ideas since the late seventies (Wood et al 1976; Cazden 1979) and Clark intends it in this way i.e. to denote the use of external structures to “alter and inform an individual’s intrinsic modes of processing and understanding” (Clark 1997, p.45). We might suggest that insofar as C&C conceive of Otto’s notebook in this way, the sense of ‘extended memory’ implied is an innocuous one. What it gives us is a figurative rather than spatial ‘extension’ of memory–an extension of memory power or capacity brought about through manipulation of external artifacts (see e.g. Menary 2007; Sutton 2009).
However neither Otto’s use of his notebook, nor the Vygotskyan considerations provide any grounds for conceiving of memory in terms of C&C’s stronger hypothesis i.e. as literally, spatially extendable or transferable. Nor do they justify any other of Clark’s similarly objectified scenarios. One cannot make a legitimate move from viewing memory aids as psychological tools to imagining that memory itself could be perceptu- ally apprehended as a stream of images (as in the Terminator scenario), or to imagining that my memories are only ‘mine’ contingently by dint of their spatial location (as in the reply to Martin Davies).
Moreover–to return to our original theme–insofar as there is a story about spati- ality to be told, the considerations outlined so far do not seem to warrant the idea that the flow of influence can be characterized unidirectionally from agent to artifact. We suggested earlier that if we do come to conceive of ourselves as “looking things up in memory” in a manner somewhat analogous to looking things up in a notebook, or if our actual practices of remembering are influenced by such a conception of things, this fact may be related to prior interaction with external artifacts. It may be that we only ‘look things up’ in memory (or think we do) because we first looked things up in notebooks. This hypothesis, it will be noted, presents only a slight variation on the Vygotskyan themes outlined above. In this case too the suggestion is that a ‘note- book’ conception of memory might be an example of the “internal reconstruction of an external operation” (1978, p.56).
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notebook as extended memory but of memory as an internalized notebook. The Otto and Inga scenario is thus not as straightforward as it first appears. It is not that Otto’s acts of remembering are mediated by external resources, whilst Inga just uses her ‘biological memory’. Rather, insofar as Inga is held to ‘look things up in memory’, her practices, or at least C&C’s conception of them, are also the result of prior mediation by external resources. If Otto’s notebook is an extended memory (i.e. an external aid to the extension of memory capacities) then Inga’s memory is an ‘extended notebook’. This, of course, is to put matters crudely, for as we have already  suggested in our brief overview of Vygotsky, the interplay between agent and  artifact is bi-directional. Nevertheless the point remains that insofar as one wants to talk about the externalization of memory in memory aids one must also talk about the resultant internalization of artifactual strategies in memory. Otherwise one is left  with,  what Menary (2007) has described as, “an asymmetric version of  externalism  where the direction of influence goes only one way” (p.39)
In laying out such considerations in relation to Clark’s work there is perhaps an air of
‘preaching to the converted’–for Clark (and Chalmers’) account of extended memory, like their account of extended mind per se, is rich and multi-faceted. As such not all of its component parts are at odds with our own analysis. Thus, just as we have seen that a non-literal conception of ‘extended memory’, compatible with Vygotskyan accounts of memory aids and psychological tools, is suggested in some of Clark’s other work (e.g. Clark 1997), so in the 1998 paper C&C, whilst talking on the one hand of a literally conceived extended memory, will also talk less problematically in terms of the notion of
‘coupling’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998a, pp.8–12). This latter view, taken from dynamic
accounts of cognition (e.g. Van Gelder and Port 1995) and well discussed elsewhere (e.g. Clark 1997, 2008; Adams and Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2009) would seem to have strong affinities with the bi-directional ‘dialectical’ interplay between agent and envi- ronment alluded to earlier. One of the purposes of this paper is perhaps therefore to show that these two notions–spatially extended memory and ‘coupling’–are not equivalent or compatible (a variant of the ‘coupling-constitution fallacy’ argument–Adams and Aizawa 2008). Firstly ‘coupling’ gives us nothing on the side of the artifact even remotely approaching literally extended memory; at most it gives us only a figurative





What implications, then, does our analysis have for the extended mind debate? A
recap of the foregoing produces the following three points.

1)   A literally extended mind involves the philosophically problematic objectifica- tion of the mental (beliefs and memories). There is however nothing problematic in the idea that we figuratively ‘extend our capacities’ through the manipulation of external artifacts.






memory (and cognition) manifest themselves through actions, and that these actions incorporate elements of the world. However it would not allow that this brings us one iota closer to the idea that memories or beliefs can in any sense be “constituted” by elements of the world.
3)   The Otto and Inga argument, insofar as it views biological memory as notebook- like, already presupposes the prior internalization of acts of information retrieval mediated by external artifacts. In highlighting this state of affairs we draw attention to the bidirectional chain of influence between agent and artifact which is not well captured by the unidirectional notion of ‘extension’.

As regards this last point, an issue that we have skirted around, and which perhaps merits further investigation, is that of whether Inga has only a notebook conception of memory, or whether she adopts practices of remembering that actually are notebook- like. Is it that C&C have made a common–perhaps universal–mistake in conceiving of the activity of remembering as being on a par with looking something up in a notebook, which mistake is itself based on the practice of information retrieval from notebook-like resources? Or is the Vygotskyan parallel stronger than this, in that our acts of remembering come to be notebook-like–in ways as yet unspecified–by virtue of our experience with artifacts of this kind?
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